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This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial
following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. Why did
the wrongdoer’s mind strike us as so endlessly disturbed? Is the Norwegian le-
gal system able to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including as
committed by psychologically impaired mass murderers?
Introduction1
The unthinkable happened on July 22nd
2011: a Norwegian citizen bombed a build-
ing («Høyblokka») in Oslo’s Government
Quarter and opened fire on hundreds of peo-
ple gathered on the small island of Utøya in a
lake just outside of Oslo. The 950 kg bomb
was placed in a car in front of Høyblokka.
When it went off, at least 250 persons were
inside the targeted building and 75 more were
in the immediate vicinity of the car. The per-
petrator – Anders Behring Breivik (hereafter:
ABB) – intended the bomb to kill as many
people as possible. He succeeded in killing
eight and seriously injuring nine more.
Roughly 200 more suffered less serious inju-
ries. After detonating the bomb, ABB traveled
to Utøya, where a total of 564 people – most-
ly teenagers and young adults – were gath-
ered for the annual meeting of the Labor Par-
ty’s youth division (“Arbeidernes Ungdoms-
fylking,» or «AUF»). ABB, posing as a police
officer in a fake uniform transported himself
and his weapons to Utøya by the AUF-ferry.
Once on the island, ABB shot and killed (by
individual gunshots) 67 people of whom only
seven were over the age of 25. Fifty-six were
under the age of 21; 33 were under the age of
18; and 14 were only 14 or 15 years old. Two
more people fell to their deaths as they at-
tempted to escape. ABB shot and injured an
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additional 33 people, and many more were
injured trying to escape or save others.2
When the police arrived in Utøya 80 minutes
after ABB, he surrendered without resistance.
In his testimony during the ten-week trial
(May-June, 2012), ABB admitted to all the
actions listed above and described, in detail,
his reasons, his plans, and his actions. His
ultranationalist manifesto, 2083 – A Euro-
pean Declaration of Independence also con-
veys much of this information. This mani-
festo, ABB claims, was written at the request
of a secret order called «Knights Templar,»
to serve as the program for a new, revolu-
tionary contrajihadist European network,
similar in its decentralized, one-cell struc-
ture to Al-Qaeda. This mix of personal
notes from his life and his terrorist agenda
includes extensive quoted or plagiarized
material from other sources, such as Theod-
ore Kaczynski’s Unabomber’s Manifesto.
The manifesto describes the supposed prob-
lems of «cultural Marxism» and «multicul-
turalism,» such as the «colonization» of Eu-
rope by Muslims. Additionally, it describes
the planned attacks, predicts likely respons-
es to the attacks, and envisions Europe’s and
Norway’s futures, where, for example, the
«proper,» «traditional» male and female
roles (currently «perverted» by feminism)
would be reestablished and Norway would
yet again be «pure.» The attacks were di-
rected at the Labor Party, in power at the
time and the most influential political party
in Norway since World War II. By attacking
Høyblokka (where the office of the Prime
Minister and Minister of Justice were locat-
ed) and Utøya (where the future leaders of
the Labor Party were gathered), ABB saw
himself attacking the heart of the Labor Par-
ty – and, so, the center of the «cultural
Marxism» that «corrupts» Norway from
within. Moreover, to injure the Labor Party
as much as possible and make the assault
spectacular (maximize the «propaganda ef-
fect»), ABB aimed to kill as many as possi-
ble. Because of delays encountered while
electronically distributing his manifesto to
newspapers and politicians, as well as traffic
delays on the morning of the attack, it was
late afternoon by the time ABB arrived at
Høyblokka. Many had already left for the
day, and there were fewer people on the
streets than he had planned for.
During the trial, ABB claimed that if he
had succeeded in killing more people at
Høyblokka, he would have abandoned the
second stage of the plan (Utøya). He also
maintained that his original goal had been
to arrive at Utøya before that day’s main
speaker, Gro Harlem Brundtland, departed.
Brundtland is nicknamed «Mother Nor-
way» (“landsmoder»), in part because she is
considered the most influential Prime Min-
ister in postwar Norway. ABB planned to
film himself decapitating Brundtland while
reading an ultranationalist statement and
make the video available on the Internet. Be-
cause of the delays, however, Brundtland
left Utøya two hours before he arrived. Ad-
ditionally, ABB had initially planned to use
the cold water around the island of Utøya as
a «weapon of mass destruction» against an-
yone who tried to swim to the mainland.
This strategy failed; many who fled were
strong swimmers, and people on the main-
land learned what was happening and sped
towards the island in their private boats to
save these swimmers. According to ABB, he
let himself be captured by the police because
it was the best strategy for the next, «prop-
aganda» stage of his revolutionary plan.
Upon capture, ABB immediately claimed
to have acted under emergency right, since
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he was protecting himself and Norway from
complete «cultural destruction.» At trial,
ABB explained that he had expected to be
tortured and killed after capture, either by
the police, by lynch mobs, or by prison
guards and inmates after a treason convic-
tion. Despite some familiarity with the con-
cept of emergency right, ABB didn’t seem
aware that torture and killing of prisoners
by the police are illegal, or that Norway has
no death penalty.3 Once the Norwegian
people understood what had happened,
however, their immediate reaction to the
tragedy was not violence but, simply, grief.
The youth at Utøya came from all over Nor-
way, and Norway’s size (a population of 5
million) entailed that many knew or were
related to the family or friends of at least
one of the victims. After the attacks, the me-
dia and the public also tried, with varying
degrees of success, to give the many people
who were personally affected space for their
grief, with ABB-free editions of newspapers
and news programs. In addition, spontane-
ous and planned public gatherings allowed
people to grieve together, in smaller commu-
nities and as a nation. At «rose marches,»
people carrying roses (the political symbol
for the Labor Party) walked together in the
streets before gathering in public squares to
share their grief – crying, holding each other,
listening to speeches, and singing. Various
public figures – members of the royal family,
government officials, former and active pol-
iticians, religious leaders, artists, and so on –
helped create these public spaces for people
to grieve together. These figures also grieved
publicly for those killed, for the bereaved,
for their own losses, for those they knew
who were suffering, and for the nation. For
the first time in history, the King (Harald)
cried during a public speech (his first after
the attacks), and the royal family, the Prime
Minister, and various public figures cried as
they hugged survivors and victims’ loved
ones. And of course, to Norwegians, it
would have been strange indeed if they
hadn’t cried.
During the first couple of weeks after the
attacks, little attention was paid to the per-
petrator. It was simply a period of grief, as it
should be. After this immediate period of
mourning was over, however, the public’s
focus naturally shifted to include ABB.
Though Norwegians were bewildered and
disoriented in the grief-stricken aftermath of
the attacks, their bewilderment dramatically
increased over the next few months as the
phenomenon of ABB was revealed. In fact,
most people appeared deeply perplexed dur-
ing the trial, because it was difficult to un-
derstand what we were witnessing. My aim
in this paper is to apply Kant’s moral philos-
ophy to some of these perplexing issues, and
thereby contribute to the public discussion
of the case. In my view, only by better un-
derstanding what happened – the kind of vi-
olence the attacks exposed us to; the ethical,
legal, and political principles upheld during
the trial; the question of which principles we
should uphold in the future – will it be pos-
sible to heal and move on as a nation, where
that includes taking on the challenging task
of considering possible legal and political re-
forms. After a brief sketch of the trial itself
(section 1), I proceed (section 2) to present a
Kantian suggestion of why the wrongdoer’s
mind struck us as so profoundly disturbed.4
The Kantian perspective, I argue in section
3, also helps us understand why it was so
important to respond to the violence
through the legal system and to treat ABB so
respectfully before, during, and after the tri-
al. Finally, in section 4, I address the contro-
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versial issue now facing Norway as we move
forward: how capable is the Norwegian le-
gal system to deal with cases involving ex-
treme violence, including the violence com-
mitted by psychologically impaired, deeply
disturbed mass murderers?
1. The Trial
The confusions surrounding the trial were
many and complex, so let me first sketch
them. The first confusion began when the
Court (“Oslo Tingrett») obtained the psy-
chiatric evaluation of ABB (standard legal
procedure). The Court first authorized a
team of two leading psychiatrists to evaluate
the legal sanity of ABB during the attacks.
Their work, begun in August of 2011, yield-
ed a psychiatric report in November, ac-
cording to which ABB had been in a psy-
chotic state when performing the actions.
ABB, the report says, has normal cognitive
and intellectual capacities, but suffered a
mental breakdown in 2006 from which he
has never recovered. In 2006, ABB moved
back into his mother’s home; withdrew
from society, family, and friends; and occu-
pied himself primarily with the computer
game «World of Warcraft.» Later, his focus
shifted to composing his extremist religious-
political manifesto and, later still, to plan-
ning and preparing for the attacks. During
this period, the report maintains, ABB be-
came a paranoid schizophrenic with grandi-
ose and bizarre (logically or factually impos-
sible) delusions. For example, he viewed
himself as a crusader engaged in a great war
between good and evil (a grandiose delu-
sion); as someone with the right to decide
who should live and who should die (anoth-
er grandiose delusion); and as a participant
at a meeting of a (non-existent) organiza-
tion, «The Knights Templar,» where he was
authorized to write a religious-political
manifesto to unify the revolutionary war ef-
forts of the organization (a bizarre delu-
sion). According to Norwegian law, a para-
noid schizophrenic with grandiose delusions
is psychotic (mentally ill), and must receive
forced mental health treatment instead of
punishment. A commission of experts on
psychiatry and psychology (“Den Rettsme-
disinske Kommisjonen,» hereafter «the
Commission») subsequently evaluated the
report (also standard legal procedure), and
unanimously approved it with only minor
comments.
This psychiatric report created public up-
roar and deeply offended ABB, who claimed
that it was filled with «200 lies». The Court
ultimately responded by appointing a sec-
ond team of psychiatrists to evaluate ABB.
They completed their work between Febru-
ary and March of 2012. Their report, issued
in April, maintains that ABB was not suffer-
ing from paranoid schizophrenia with gran-
diose and bizarre delusions and was not psy-
chotic during the attacks. According to this
report, ABB’s descriptions of Europe should
be understood in the context of his extreme
political views. Since such descriptions are
common among extremists of his type, they
do not qualify as delusional. Moreover, this
report argues that ABB was not delusional
(psychotic), but rather that he exaggerated,
fantasized, or lied (and still does) in his var-
ious descriptions of the Knights Templar or-
ganization. He is, they argue, an aggressive,
extreme political activist suffering from a
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD),
namely, a dissocial personality disorder in-
volving self-absorption and the consequent
inability to be empathetic and respond ap-
propriately to other persons’ points of view.
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An aggressive NPD and extreme political
views do not make one legally insane, and
hence, this report concludes, ABB is punish-
able. The majority of the Norwegian people
seemed relieved by this second report and
supported it. ABB was likewise happy about
its basic claim that he was legally sane.
Once the Commission completed its offi-
cial evaluation of the second report, new
confusion arose. No one – not the Court,
the lawyers, the media, nor anyone else –
could figure out whether or not the Com-
mission actually had approved it.5 Absent a
decision about which report the Court
should use, the ten-week trial began in May
of 2012 with both psychiatric teams present
in the courtroom. In their opening state-
ments, the prosecutors explained that they
would defend the claim that the defendant
was legally insane during the attacks (in ac-
cordance with the first report), whereas the
defense attorney declared that he would
challenge this and argue for his client’s legal
sanity (in accordance with both the second
report and ABB’s wishes). 
The first week of the trial was devoted to
ABB’s own statement and follow-up ques-
tions from the prosecutors, defense attor-
ney, and the judges. Lars Gule, a Norwegian
philosopher and expert witness on extremist
political ideologies, described feeling as if
«the gates of hell» were opened when ABB
spoke, especially when he recounted the kill-
ings at Utøya. The newspaper reported that
even the public officials, all of whom were
well prepared psychologically for ABB’s tes-
timony, looked pained as they kept their
emotions in check while the worst details
were given. ABB, in contrast, was largely
dispassionate. He became spirited only
while describing his planning and the at-
tacks themelves. Though passionate when
explaining his extremist political ideology,
he withdrew or became angry or annoyed
when questioned about his childhood, up-
bringing, or psychological state rather than
his ideology or the preparation and execu-
tion of the attacks. Sometimes he laughed –
either sarcastically at the prosecutors or wit-
nesses, or self-consciously when he realized
he had said something particularly stupid.
ABB had tears in his eyes only twice: on the
first day, when clips were shown from the
propaganda film he made to broadcast his
manifesto, and later when his mother was
referenced for the first time. Otherwise, he
showed no signs of regret, remorse, or any
other emotions appropriate to the circum-
stances. He never had to fight to control his
emotions when describing what he had
done, facing his victims, or listening to the
testimony of his victims’ loved ones. Not
once was there reason to think that he un-
derstood, in the ordinary moral sense of the
word, what he had done. He repeatedly de-
scribed his actions as «gruesome, but neces-
sary,» which, with his gestures, communi-
cated his conviction that his actions revealed
psychological strength. When questioned
about his apparent inability to experience
empathy, he maintained that he had trained
himself not to feel emotions (by «dehuman-
izing others»), and explained that he could
not allow himself to experience empathy be-
cause then he would «break down.» When
further questioned about whether he could
deliberately choose to feel empathy, he re-
fused to answer.
As the trial developed, it became evident
that most (if not all) of us couldn’t under-
stand what we were observing. It wasn’t so
strange, as it turned out, that there were two
conflicting psychiatric evaluations of ABB.
No one seemed capable of convincingly ex-
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plaining what we were seeing, despite the
many bombastic statements about ABB’s
psychological profile made during the trial,
by psychiatrists, psychologists, reporters,
philosophers, legal scholars, and historians,
among others. In any case, once ABB toned
down the grandiosity of his account, he and
the prosecution disagreed over only four sig-
nificant factual points,6 while he and his
own defense lawyer disagreed over two. The
only point of discrepancy between ABB’s de-
scriptions of the events and those of the sur-
vivors concerned some survivors’ claims
that ABB expressed thrill (e.g., yelled «wo-
hoo!») while he was shooting at the youth at
Utøya. Neither the defense nor the prosecu-
tion noted this difference in their final pro-
ceedings.
In their closing statement, the prosecutors
explained that they were not certain regard-
ing the issue of legal sanity, but found it cor-
rect to uphold their original claim (follow-
ing the first psychiatric report) that ABB had
been in a psychotic state during the attacks.
The trial and the second psychiatric report
provided insufficient reason, they argued, to
think that ABB was «merely» an extreme
political activist with an NPD.7 Neverthe-
less, ABB’s two acts of terror, the prosecu-
tors continued, should be understood as
punishable according to the Penal Code’s
§§147a, 148, and 223.8 Hence, the prosecu-
tion contended that if the Court ruled that
ABB was legally sane during the attacks,
then he should be punished with the legal
maximum in Norway for any crime: 21
years in prison under the category of «for-
varing» (“safekeeping»). «Forvaring»
means that even after having served a sen-
tence, a prisoner cannot be released unless
psychiatrists deem him or her no longer a
danger to society.9 The prosecution further
argued that when doubt exists in a legal pro-
ceeding, Norwegian law requires that the
doubt benefit the defendant. Since it is
worse to sentence a mentally ill individual to
prison than to force a mentally healthy indi-
vidual to receive mental health treatment,
the latter option should be chosen. Still, they
concluded, since ABB was legally insane
when performing his actions (psychotic), he
should be admitted to forced treatment in a
mental health facility according to Penal
Code §39.
Also the defense expressed a lack of com-
plete confidence regarding the issue of ABB’s
legal sanity, but continued by explaining that
he and his team still found it correct to deem
ABB legally sane. In addition, the defense
formally presented (but did not defend)
ABB’s claim that he was not guilty in the
charges against him, and presented as plau-
sible ABB’s claim that he decided to carry
out the attack at Utøya only after hearing
about the Høyblokka-bomb’s ineffectiveness
on the radio. The defense also defended
ABB’s view that he should be given the mild-
est possible punishment (prison) if found
guilty, and not «forvaring» (safekeeping), as
there was good reason to believe that he
would now politically protest by means of
the pen only. Most of the defense attorney’s
closing statement focused, however, on
ABB’s claim that he was legally sane during
the attacks.10 The defense argued that since
the two psychiatric reports were inconsist-
ent, the Court stood free to disregard them.
Moreover, he emphasized the human right to
assume responsibility for one’s actions and
maintained that being forced to receive men-
tal health treatment when healthy is just as
bad as being forced into prison when men-
tally ill. The defense then endorsed the sec-
ond report’s claim that ABB was suffering
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from a lack of empathy (of the kind associat-
ed with NPD) in combination with extreme
political views, rather than delusions. The
evidence for this claim was the absence of a
significant history of violence (for ABB) and
ABB’s decision not to kill three people at
Utøya whom he identified as innocents rath-
er than as «political targets.»11 The defense
also argued that the evidence supported the
second report’s claim that ABB mistakenly
believed in a colonizing war between Euro-
peans and Muslims (as is common in these
extremist political milieus) and that ABB had
exaggerated, fantasized, or lied about the ex-
istence of the Knights Templar. The defense
also emphasized mistaken beliefs that ABB
had corrected, such as his misapprehension
about torture in Norwegian prisons. The de-
fense further argued that ABB’s behavior
showed that he clearly knew it was wrong
«in our culture» to kill. ABB «chose to kill»
because the end (the revolution) legitimated
the means (the killings), a classic line of rea-
soning of terrorists. Additionally, several
professionals who had evaluated ABB in the
period after his surrender (such as the psy-
chiatrist who evaluated his risk of suicide
and the experienced prison guards who were
around him) did not observe any signs of
psychosis (and so did not treat him as a py-
chotic). Finally, the defense supported the
second report’s claim that ABB’s withdrawal
in 2006 was not caused by a mental break-
down, since during this withdrawn period
ABB was still able to make a lot of money
(legally and illegally), participate in online
political forums and the World of Warcraft
community, and manage his relationships
with family and friends, all while keeping his
terrorist project a secret. 
The final verdict came down on August
24, 2012: the Court deemed ABB legally
sane during the attacks and sentenced him
to 21 years of «forvaring,» specifying that
he must spend a minimum of 10 years in
prison. Undoubtedly, most were relieved
that the Court followed the second report’s
determination of legal sanity, and that the
sentence was for «forvaring.» Even those
who agreed with the prosecution that ABB
should be deemed legally insane found that
the trial had settled this issue legitimately. It
was clear, however, that most people didn’t
fully understand their own responses or ex-
actly what had happened in the trial. Many
also experienced significant frustration
over the fact that ABB might one day be
free, whether they were personally and di-
rectly affected by his crimes or not. Many
were uncomfortable with the attention ABB
had received throughout the trial, which al-
lowed him to express his «propaganda»
and offensive thoughts. Some were puzzled
by the respect ABB was accorded, not only
in light of his horrendous acts of violence,
but also his at times offensive courtroom
behavior. Still, both during and after the tri-
al most people, including victims and vic-
tims’ loved ones expressed deep gratitude
for the way most of those involved in the
trial conducted themselves, in particular the
judges, the prosecutors, the defense, and
much of the media. Clearly, too, many ex-
pressed admiration for the incredible cour-
age the victims displayed in helping each
other during the attacks and in facing and
testifying against ABB during the trial. Fi-
nally, most found it hard to find ways to
capture the seemingly bottomless tragedy of
it all, a tragedy compassing ABB and his
family and friends. In the following sec-
tions, I use Kantian philosophical theory to
provide a unified account of these varied re-
sponses to the trial, in the hope of contrib-
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uting to the continuous, public discussion
surrounding it. I’ll begin with the central
question of ABB’s legal sanity.
2. Mental vs. Moral Illness
The two psychiatric reports disagree, as we
saw above, about whether ABB was suffer-
ing from paranoid schizophrenia with gran-
diose and bizarre delusions (the first report,
which the prosecution found most persua-
sive) or from a narcissistic personality disor-
der (NPD) in combination with aggressive,
extreme political views (the second report,
which the defense favored). I will argue that
people who suffer from mental illness can-
not be punished because their conditions
make it impossible for them, by their own
devices, to correct their mistaken beliefs and
so to act as persons responsible for their ac-
tions. I then distinguish mental illness from
personality disorders (such as NPD) by char-
acterizing the latter as conditions that sub-
jectively challenge (but do not make impos-
sible) one’s ability to act morally, or «as a
person.» When a person gives in to the chal-
lenges associated with such a personality dis-
order, we may say, that he becomes morally
ill.12 Understanding ABB as suffering from a
condition posing subjective, constitutional
challenges to his ability to act morally (as a
person) can explain two things: (1) why we
both hold him legally responsible for his ac-
tions (since he can assume responsibility for
his mistaken beliefs) and (2) why a normal
prison sentence would be insufficient to deal
with the danger he poses as long as he does
not take on the job of learning how to regain
control over his psychological condition. I
also argue that if we set aside questions
about the possible mental state of ABB at the
time of the crime, his aggressive NPD ex-
plains not only his racist and sexist beliefs,
but his particular way of envisioning the fu-
ture of Norway. Finally, if we assume that
this is also the correct diagnosis of ABB at
the time of the crime, then, I maintain, the
«forvaring» (safekeeping) clause in the pris-
on sentence was appropriate.
2.1 Mental Illness and Legal Insanity
How is it that we can understand those suf-
fering from paranoid schizophrenia with de-
lusions mentally ill in such a way that they
cannot be responsible and punished for their
wrongful actions? The paranoid schizo-
phrenic with grandiose delusions is mentally
ill in the sense that she cannot understand
what is really going on; she fundamentally
misperceives factual reality without having
the ability to correct her mistaken beliefs
about the world. Such a person cannot as-
sume responsibility for her actions, since it
is impossible for her to perceive the world as
it actually is and so her actions as they actu-
ally are. 
The first psychiatric team believed ABB
was suffering from this condition because of
the way in which he explained himself and
his actions when they first encountered him
just after the attacks; his behavior then, they
argue, only makes sense on the assumption
of grandiose and bizarre delusions (rather
than correctible, mistaken beliefs). The
most worrisome of these, I take it, were not
the grandiose delusions, since ABB was of-
ten willing to tone these down, but the bi-
zarre ones, including ABB’s claims about the
existence of the «Knights Templar» organi-
zation and his meeting with its leaders – a
description shown by the police to be false.
The first psychiatric team maintained that
ABB genuinely believed this when they first
met him, and since he didn’t budge on this
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point during cross-examination, the prose-
cution found that they had to follow the
first report, despite their significant doubts
about its correctness.
2.2 Moral Illness and Legal Sanity
ABB’s behavior in the courtroom corre-
sponds to that of a person suffering from an
aggressive narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD), which was the diagnosis of the sec-
ond report, and the one supported by the
defense and affirmed by the Court. In fact,
such a diagnosis explains much of what was
so terrifying about ABB’s behavior in the
courtroom. ABB’s detailed descriptions (and
very accurate memory) of his extreme vio-
lence were deeply frightening, as was his
lack of empathy, sadness, compassion, or
any emotional or cognitive struggle while
describing his actions or when confronting
his victims and their loved ones.13 
Yet we must wonder what it is about peo-
ple with an aggressive NPD that makes them
less able to experience various morally ap-
propriate emotions, such as affection, empa-
thy, and compassion. How is it that they are
legally responsible for their actions even if
they cannot easily experience these morally
appropriate emotions? In what follows, I
elaborate on the idea that suffering from an
NPD should be understood as suffering
from a condition that constitutionally, sub-
jectively challenges one’s ability to have the
kind of focus and moral, affectionate emo-
tions constitutive of being a person. If not
dealt with and kept under control, such a
condition can spiral into deeply morally dis-
turbed ways of being, as happened in this
case. I argue that, because those suffering
from these conditions can correct their be-
liefs (at all times) and so are making choices
to set aside societal norms as they commit
their wrongful actions, they are legally re-
sponsible for them. This explanation of the
moral responsibility associated with aggres-
sive NPD also explains how the account
makes sense of the «forvaring» clause.
Having an NPD is commonly understood
to involve extreme self-absorption: it is a
psychological condition characterized by an
excessive sense of self-importance, a lack of
empathy, and a radical preoccupation with
oneself and one’s own concerns. Surprising-
ly, then, my Kantian analysis attributes this
kind of moral disorder to the lack of a
healthy sense of self. That is why it’s a per-
sonality disorder: this condition subjective-
ly, constitutionally challenges a human be-
ing’s ability to be a person.14 According to
Kant, having a healthy moral self involves
being capable of setting and pursuing ends
of one’s own, in a manner determined by
one’s own reason. When one acts in this
way, one’s actions are compatible with eve-
ryone else acting in the same, reciprocally
respectful way at all times, whether in the
pursuit of one’s individual ends or ends
adopted jointly with others. There are, how-
ever, various conditions or aspects of such a
healthy self that come prior to it and enable
it to flourish through the choices it makes.
The absence of these prior elements requires
a person to concentrate too much on con-
structing the self itself – of creating a sense
of self, a sense of existing – instead of con-
centrating on ends to be pursued in the
world (on one’s own or together with oth-
ers). The person with an NPD has only par-
tially developed some of these prior features
of a healthy self, which makes her so easily
preoccupied with herself.
The healthy way to respond to the fact
that one’s reactions and preoccupations
seem a little off as compared to those of oth-
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ers – the fact that others seem more stable
and at ease with themselves, including when
they are emotionally upset – is, of course, to
get some of the missing bits in place. This is
the work of therapy, and for most it requires
some psychological or psychiatric guidance.
A person who does not compensate for his
inabilities with this kind of work has an un-
stable basis in himself and thus a constant
need to turn the focus onto himself. He may
try to flee away from interactions and his
own self altogether through drugs, alcohol,
dangerous activities, intense entertainment,
and the like. In addition, such a person turns
aggressive when he makes others to pay at-
tention to him and make him their primary
project. The preoccupation with himself
constantly challenges or makes unstable his
ability to love, respect, and care for others in
the right way, in a way consistent with oth-
ers having ends of their own too.15
Normative yet psychological features en-
able us to be healthy, functioning emotional
persons. These personal and social features
include our unreflective personal and social
identities (who we are), and they concern
how we are fundamentally grounded in the
world, how we feel safe in the world as the
persons we are. These ways that we sponta-
neously, naturally, or automatically perceive
or emotionally orient ourselves in the world
as a normative space are unreflective, in
contrast to how we reflectively think about
or act in the world. For example, many of
my moral emotions (what I love, grieve,
take pride in, am ashamed of, etc.) are
linked to my identity as a Norwegian wom-
an with a particular family and set of
friends. These parts of me are not things I’ve
simply chosen, but features of me that I’ve
either been given (nationality, family) and
have affection for or found myself affection-
ately drawn to (close friends). Such unreflec-
tive identities give us a sense of being in a
good world in which we have a good place,
a place that is ours and that is affirmed by
others. Insofar as these identifies are
healthy, they are part of what makes us feel
existentially secure, so that we can confi-
dently and playfully set and pursue our
projects. They compose the assumed, unre-
flective background that gives us the confi-
dence to act as persons in the world. Just as
we are oriented toward the countries and
people in the world that are part of who we
are – those we love and deeply care for – the
people of those countries and the people we
love are similarly oriented toward us. We all
assume such a background as we go about
our lives in the world in good ways.
Morally healthy persons (for our purpos-
es here: those who are not suffering from
NPDs) always already (unreflectively) as-
sume that they are being seen and paid at-
tention to even if they are not the explicit
objects of others’ attention. They relate to
the world as a safe place where they can in-
teract with others as the people they are. As
a result, their confidence to act in the is not
conditional on others explicitly focusing on
them or being about them. In contrast, mor-
ally challenged persons (again, here: persons
with NPDs) do not always or easily (unre-
flectively) assume that they are seen and tak-
en into account when they are not explicitly
the object of others’ attention. Nor do they
always assume that the world is a safe place
– a world that is theirs to enjoy, where they
should challenge themselves and pursue
their projects. Instead, they experience the
world as an uneasy, unsafe place that for-
gets, ignores, or attacks them; they readily
feel unimportant or disregarded, though
these feels have no factual basis. As a result,
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these people are morally challenged in the
sense that their basic orientation in the
world is not one of carefree, healthy engage-
ment, but one that makes it hard for them
not to make their own selves their main
project, instead of other projects. Persons
struggling with NPDs are self-absorbed be-
cause they lack a sufficient self; without this
stable foundation they get preoccupied with
themselves, and require the affirming atten-
tion of others.
Those who have aggressive versions of
this moral disorder need to ensure that oth-
ers focus on (are oriented towards) them at
all times. Unless they are drawing the
world’s attention, they get an unnerving
sense that they do not exist at all – and so
they turn aggressive. Moreover, this funda-
mental self-absorption makes such persons
struggle with other-directed moral emo-
tions, such as affection, empathy, sympathy,
and compassion. Such emotions presuppose
that one is fundamentally also other-oriented.
The person who lets her self-absorption de-
velop unrestrainedly – by being unwilling to
figure out why she keeps ending up in trou-
bles in her relationships with others or by
not wanting to figure out how to get it all
under control – will not see her own lack of
other-directedness as a problem. Instead,
she will tell a story according to which it is
the world, and not her, that is the problem.
The person who gives up in these ways is no
longer only morally challenged, but morally
ill. Such lack of emotional orientation to-
wards others is not something one can sim-
ply think oneself in or out of; it is not
changeable by such reflective means. Our
capacity for reflection makes it possible for
someone to take up the fight against the per-
sonality disorder – to get or keep it under
control – since it makes it possible for us to
recognize it and relate to it rationally. Much
of the repairing or healing work itself is un-
reflective in nature, however, and it is ena-
bled by therapists, psychologists, and psy-
chiatrists.16
If we reconsider ABB at this point, we
may note four things. First, during the trial
it became clear that ABB is aware that he
doesn’t have moral emotions like empathy
in the way others do. Second, during the tri-
al he also remarked that if he did open up to
these emotions again, he would be de-
stroyed by what he had done and that this is
why he’s chosen not to be open to them.
Third, ABB claimed that he is different from
other people with regard to such emotions
because he trained himself not to experience
them; he argued that his inability to experi-
ence these emotions reflects his psychologi-
cal strength. Relatedly, he didn’t (and
doesn’t) understand that such moral emo-
tions are not something about which one
can simply choose; that one cannot simply
choose to keep them at a distance or have
them. What he understood as his psycholog-
ical training of «dehumanizing» others was
in reality giving in to or furthering his con-
dition. His inability to experience these
emotions is therefore not a reflection of how
strong he is, but of how morally ill he has
become. Fourth, viewing ABB as morally
sick makes intelligible otherwise inexplica-
ble aspects of his killing spree on the island.
ABB was elated and expressed joy when he
threatened, terrified, and killed the people
on the island because having such power
over them – having their sole attention – fed
the void his lack of self creates. It supplied a
sense of being alive, of intensely existing.
Being morally challenged in this way – be-
ing subjectively, constitutionally encum-
bered in one’s ability to act and interact as a
NFT-2014-3-4.book  Page 246  Tuesday, November 25, 2014  1:03 PM
the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 · 247
person – makes personal, including intimate
human love, a complex moral emotion, dif-
ficult. Although persons suffering from an
NPD can love in the sense of being passion-
ately oriented toward the world and beings
in it, their self-absorption gives them trouble
loving persons as persons and being loved
themselves as persons, that is, as beings who
pursue ends of their own. Someone who is
not self-absorbed wants to be loved by peo-
ple who also flourish through their own, in-
dependent projects in the world. Being
drawn to a different person as a person,
therefore, requires that one has a sufficiently
stable, confident self. The person suffering
from an NPD faces the constant risk of los-
ing confidence in herself, and she is threat-
ened both by the lack of explicit attention
from the other and by the very process of af-
firming the other. Focusing on the other per-
son makes her feel as if she loses herself. Lov-
ing such a self-absorbed person therefore be-
comes a draining emotional experience.
Moreover, when self-absorption turns
aggressive, the failure to affirm the other’s
difference becomes a drive to destroy the
other’s difference and independent sense of
self. The person suffering from aggressive
NPB will assert his sense of self and make
others stay focused on him through any
available means, including threats, coer-
cion, and violence. Although we are moral-
ly committed to treating morally ill persons
respectfully (what the Kantian account
would call practical or moral love) those
who are aggressive towards others are un-
lovable in this sense: being affectionately or
emotionally open to them is self-destruc-
tive. One can and should love them morally
(respect them), but not affectionately (be
emotionally open to them). A similar dis-
tinction holds when we move from the inti-
mate, personal self to the social aspect of
the self, such as one’s love for one’s country.
The love a morally healthy person has for
her country presupposes that the country is
a country for persons, where everyone sets
and pursues ends of their own, in the ways
that makes life meaningful for them. Inso-
far as her country is not yet this, she will
also be angry at and ashamed of her coun-
try – making it in part exactly her job to im-
prove it; it’s her county. The morally chal-
lenged or sick person, in contrast, may pas-
sionately love her country, but not in a way
that presupposes the country as essentially
being, again, a country by and for persons;
instead her love of country is what Kant
calls pathological love, in that she views the
country as something whose purpose is sim-
ply to affirm her sense of self.
It is revealing, then, that ABB has never
had an intimate, loving relationship of any
kind as an adult, and even his long-term
friendships from childhood were not partic-
ularly developed, mature, or deep. In addi-
tion, during the trial, he appeared to have
emotive reactions revealing affective love
only twice, namely, when his propaganda
film was shown and when his mother was
mentioned for the first time.17 At all other
times, he reacted with anger or withdrawal
to anything said about him or his private life
and childhood. Moreover, his love for the
Norway he fantasized and his mother can-
not be understood as expressions of a ma-
ture, healthy love of country and of persons.
Rather, it is a pathological love fundamen-
tally at odds with our human nature and
morality (practical reason). First, take his
love for his (now late) mother. This loving
relation was, as far as we can tell, funda-
mentally asymmetrical. His mother never
challenged how he lived in her home, he did
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not provide any care for her even though she
was frail and sick (she passed away in the
year after the trial), and he yelled at her
when she didn’t «respect his space.»
Second, consider his love of country. «His
country» is not an ideal of our current coun-
try – a state constitutionally committed to
respecting all citizens as free and equal – but
a fantasy, fascist, totalitarian version of it,
where a similarly asymmetrical love is real-
ized. In his «ideal» Norway, ABB himself
would be adored by all Norwegian citizens.
In this imaginary society his (and every «re-
al» man’s) manhood would be affirmed by
all women, including in the intimate person-
al spheres. Women would live up to what he
considers the true, traditional gender ideal:
lacking an independent sense of self, women
would instead obtain their sense of self
through affirming their men and their
projects. Any woman who would not love
him and other men in this way should and
would be punished, according to ABB’s log-
ic. Moreover, not only would his manhood
be affirmed in these ways, but he himself
would be affirmed as the leader of this great
nation: he is the as-of-yet unrecognized but
true patriarch of Norway, its real «landsfad-
er» (“Father Norway»). Rather than con-
front the instabilities in his psychological
constitution, ABB let them develop into a
full-fledged, aggressive self-absorption,
which is of course incompatible with genu-
inely loving anyone, including himself, as a
person. His conceptions of manhood and
ethnicity are therefore based on the partial
or full denial, or even destruction, of certain
other persons as persons. Presumably any
human beings who can interact with others
as persons would be in danger in ABB’s
Norway since they would necessarily yield
resistance to him and his vision.
No one quite knows why some persons
suffer from NPDs, let alone the aggressive
kind. Most, however, believe that they are
frequently intertwined with psychologically
abusive, disturbed, or challenged child-
hoods. This certainly seems true in the case
of ABB, though it is not a complete explana-
tion. People with much worse childhoods
than his do not end up struggling with NPDs
or become morally ill. The backstory of
ABB’s life is sad, but not tragic. He grew up
in one of the richest parts of Oslo, yet came
from a home of limited means. He had one
sibling and a somewhat psychologically un-
stable mother on welfare: his father aban-
doned the family early on.18 His teenage
years and young adult life involved a series
of failures: dropping out of high school; fail-
ing in politics after attempting to rise in the
ranks in the populist Norwegian rightwing,
libertarian political party (“Fremskrittsparti-
et»); and proving inadequate as a contribu-
tor to public debate when newspapers
wouldn’t publish his political writings. These
particular failings parallel central theses in
his «manifesto,» which recasts these failures
as consequences of the world’s perverted val-
ues. The manifesto envisions a changed so-
cial world, a world he has changed through
his choices. In this new world – which he
posits as the original, real world – gender
roles and «true Norwegianness» are changed
so that his greatness is realizable and recog-
nized. This world affirms him instead of re-
jects him. The manifesto expresses limitless
self-absorption and fantasizes an aggressive,
morally disturbed world in which ABB is
lovingly adored as a great man (by whatever
woman he would share an intimate life with
and generally, by all women) and as a great
leader (by all Norwegians): a fantasy of be-
ing truly seen and therefore really existing
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for the first time. For his fantasy to come
true, ABB first had to eliminate everyone tied
to the current social and political reality of
Norway. This project would, if necessary, in-
volve imprisoning or killing all morally
healthy Norwegians, as they would not af-
firm him. The bombings, shootings, and
planned beheading were a logical beginning
of his revolution: by killing the current and
future leadership of the Labor Party as well
as «mother» Norway (Brundtland), he
would take the first symbolic step toward
ridding Norway of its multicultural, Marx-
ist, feminist corruption and replacing it with
the «true» Norwegian values and Norway’s
true patriarch: himself.
As we have seen, persons suffering from
NPDs struggle to experience the other-direct-
ed emotions constitutive of being a person,
and they are more likely to fail in their efforts
to develop full, healthy ethical characters.
Those who have lost this struggle, which
NPD makes harder, and become self-and oth-
er-destructive (aggressive) in their actions are
what I have called morally ill. The morally
challenged and the morally sick are nonethe-
less ethically and legally responsible for their
actions. They either already know or can ob-
tain knowledge about why their moral emo-
tions and ways of acting are importantly dif-
ferent than those of other people – why they
keep getting into related trouble or underper-
form by normal standards – and they have
the subjective, including emotional resources
available to correct their mistaken beliefs.
Hence they have a duty to obtain insight into
their own condition so that they can resist,
control, or overcome it. They remain ethical-
ly and legally responsible for their beliefs (in-
cluding the mistaken ones) and for the ac-
tions they base on these mistaken beliefs. The
ABB case illustrates this responsibility, at
least it does right now. During the trial, ABB
explained that he knows that his emotional
life is not quite like that of others, and espe-
cially with regard to feelings like empathy.
Yet he didn’t deny that he has known these
feelings to some extent in his life, and his
spontaneous expressions of sadness when his
mother was mentioned for the first time and
when his affection for his country was stimu-
lated also affirm the assumption that al-
though impaired, the capacity for such emo-
tional orientation is not completely absent.19
The trial also showed, many times, that ABB
can correct mistaken beliefs – as the defense
attorney pointed out.20
During the trial his defense attorney (who
knew him very well by the time of the trial)
affirmed that ABB sometimes lies (and so
knows the difference between truth and
lies). In fact, assuming that ABB lies ex-
plains each of the four factual points where
ABB refused to yield during cross-examina-
tions: 1) the existence of Knights Templar;
2) the beginning of the planning of the at-
tacks and the writing of the manifesto; 3)
the truth of the first psychiatric team’s re-
port of their conversations with ABB after
the attacks; and 4) the question of whether
ABB would have proceeded to Utøya if he’d
succeeded in killing more people at Høy-
blokka. Given ABB’s aim, namely to contin-
ue a «propaganda stage» from within the
prison, lying about all four makes strategic
sense: 1.) Lying about the existence of
Knights Templar presents ABB to other dis-
turbed minds as a great leader of a move-
ment of historical proportions; 2.) Lying
about when he began writing of the mani-
festo (claiming an earlier origin) upholds his
self-image as a strong leader with tremen-
dous self-control and planning skills; 3.) Ly-
ing about the first report conceals both the
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extent of his narcissism and the possibility
that he is legally insane; 4.) Lying about hav-
ing already decided to complete both steps
of the plan forestalls the moral outrage at
the Utøya killings expressed even by very
extremist rightwing milieus; after all, killing
children with automatic guns is neither cou-
rageous nor easily construed as the first
stage of a great moral revolution. In fact,
during the trial when ABB was pushed on
this point, his main response was not to say
that it was OK to kill children; instead he
kept trying to resist the descriptions of the
«children» by saying they «looked older»
and by upholding the mantra that they were
«gruesome, but necessary» actions. ABB
was willing to correct all the other «grandi-
ose» and «bizarre» statements that were in-
cluded in the first psychiatric report and
things about which he was factually mistak-
en were also correctible by him.
At least by the time of the trial, therefor,
ABB knew that his emotional life is not
quite like that of others (and somewhat
changed from earlier stages of his life) and
had the ability to correct mistaken beliefs.
He seems also to have had this ability to at
least some extent right after the killings
(when he corrected beliefs about torture in
prison, for example). He was and is terribly
mistaken in some of his views, but he has
the ability to correct them. If he could also
self-correct at the time of the crimes and
preparations for them, he is responsible for
his choice not to investigate the truth of
these beliefs, since he had the abilities need-
ed to enable him to do so. If second report is
correct and hence ABB’s described accurate-
ly how he reasoned at the time of the kill-
ings, ABB is responsible for each time he de-
cided to kill yet another person on the is-
land. He told us, chillingly, that as he left the
ferry he thought that it was «now or never,»
that now he had to either go through with it
or not – and he chose to go through with it.
Again, assuming there were no delusions
here and his account is accurate, he made a
choice each time he decided to pull that trig-
ger – and he is responsible for having done
so; he could have done otherwise, as indeed
he showed himself capable of doing four
times (when he decided he wouldn’t kill
three individuals and chose to surrender
when the police arrived).21
Let me end this section by explaining why
the defense was mistaken to argue that be-
cause ABB is likely to use the pen rather
than violent aggression to express his politi-
cal views in the future, ABB should be given
a normal prison sentence instead of «forvar-
ing.» This part of the defense’s argument
contradicts the second psychiatric report,
which maintains that ABB is still aggressive
and dangerous and which I believe is cor-
rect. Let me focus first on the dangerous di-
mension of ABB’s current psychology. If my
analysis of ABB’s psychological status is cor-
rect, then there is no reason to think that he
will not act in the same way again. Further-
more, ABB revealed further the aggressive
element at play in his being through his ex-
pressions of thrill and joy. Finding joy in the
execution of terrible crimes only makes
sense on two possible assumptions: either
ABB was in a psychotic state (the first re-
port, which ABB and the defense deny) or
ABB obtains an immensely elated sense of
self (thrill) by experiencing total destructive
power over other persons (the second re-
port). Other manifestations of aggressive
self-absorption demonstrate similarly ag-
gressive forms of NPD over which the per-
petrators have lost control: men who feel
empowered, important, profoundly justi-
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fied, or thrilled by abusing their families
(their girlfriends, wives, children, etc.), or
people who obtain pleasure and excitement
by torturing or killing people of different
sexual identities or orientations. Such peo-
ple are not «merely» suffering from NPD,
and they are no longer merely morally chal-
lenged or unstable. Rather, they are danger-
ous and aggressive; they are morally ill. For
this reason, the appropriate legal sentence
also for them is «forvaring»; they cannot
simply be released into society again once
their sentence is served. 
It follows from the above that only
trained professionals can establish that it is
safe to release people suffering from NPDs,
professionals who not only can help people
learn how to deal with their NPDs and how
to get them under control, but who can also
evaluate the success of the treatment. Given
the disagreement among trained profession-
als in Norway concerning this issue and the
utter confusion surrounding the Commis-
sion’s handling of the case, it seems that we
do not currently have available the kind of
psychiatric expertise that the legal-political
system of punishment requires to function
properly. Proper functioning would include,
presumably, requiring prisoners voluntarily
(as no one can be forced to do the kind of
psychological work required) to undergo
therapy appropriate to their conditions be-
fore they are considered for release – and
having available the kind of treatment need-
ed for such a system to function. Currently,
there therefore seems to be both a lack of
professional understanding of these kinds of
cases (reflected in the two psychiatric re-
ports and the Commission’s handling of the
cases) and the corresponding psychiatric
and psychological treatment system such
criminals need.
3. Upholding Our Humanity through 
Legal Procedures
Most Norwegians are grateful for the re-
spectful way public officials and witnesses
participated in the trial, and yet it remains
puzzling to many exactly why treating ABB
respectfully was so important. After all, not
only did he commit some of the worst
crimes possible, but his behavior in the
courtroom itself was morally disturbing (his
fascist morning salutes) and profoundly of-
fensive (his condescending laughter at the
officials or the victims). It is also puzzling
why most who disagreed with the final deci-
sion concerning ABB’s legal sanity still con-
sidered the verdict legitimate. I address these
two puzzles in this section by, once again,
drawing upon Kant’s moral philosophy,
though here with a special emphasis on his
philosophy of right. In particular, I draw
upon Kant’s conceptions of respect for hu-
manity, the role of public officials, the pur-
pose of punishment, and «wrongdoing in
the highest degree.»
The starting point for Kant’s liberal theo-
ry of justice is that commitment to justice re-
quires us to subject our interactions to uni-
versal laws of freedom. Moreover, as equals,
we do not have a right to put ourselves up as
judges over each other’s lives and actions. In
addition, we neither do nor can know which
punishments people objectively deserve
when they act wrongfully (since we cannot
access their first personal perspectives).
Consequently, any individual who decides
to punish another for her wrongful actions
thereby wrongfully subjects that person to
her individual choice rather than to univer-
sal laws of freedom. For Kant, therefore,
rightful punishment requires a public au-
thority, or an artificial, institutional person
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that represents our general, united will and
thereby enables rightful punishment within
the legal-political framework of a liberal
state. As public officials, the judges (and ju-
ry, if there is one) constitute the court acting
on behalf of all of us, including the wrong-
doer, in order to determine guilt and decide
on punishment. As a result, the punishment
does not result from the choice of any pri-
vate individual, but from a legal, public in-
stitution that is set up so as to enable a rep-
resentation of an «us» – all of us, including
the wrongdoer. Not only is this the best we
can do, but it is what we have a duty to do
insofar as we are committed to the norma-
tive ideals of our liberal states, or our states
as constitutionally bound to regard each cit-
izen as having a right to be subject only to
universal laws of freedom and not each oth-
er’s arbitrary choices. Thus, the public au-
thority is entrusted to act on our behalf by
applying the relevant laws to determine a
particular case. The court’s reasonable and
respectful adherence to the law at all times
and reflected in the behavior of all of its of-
ficers, enabled us all to relate to the case and
to ABB in a way consistent with our deepest
moral commitments of justice, in spite of
ABB’s own flagrant disrespect for these ide-
als (with regard to himself, his terrible treat-
ment of himself, and everyone else).
Situations like this one have, in other
words, no morally uncomplicated way out.
On any plausible liberal theory of right, no
person has a right to kill the innocent, and
everyone acts within her rights when she
stops a person from doing so, even when
that requires employing lethal force. If any
of the young people on Utøya who tried to
stop ABB had succeeded, they would not
have wronged ABB in so doing, even
though, in a just state, no one but the police
has a right to use coercion. In this case, since
the police were de facto unavailable (as the
one police officer on the island was among
the first to be killed), the young people
could have considered themselves «depu-
tized» (to temporarily act as police officers)
to use force to stop the killer.22 Most liberal
theories make sense of such self-defensive
uses of violence. Kant suggests, however, is
that it remains fundamentally the case that
no private individual has a right to use coer-
cion unilaterally against another. Moreover,
performing any action that is generally
wrong, such as killing someone always
comes at a moral cost, even when we do not
wrong anyone in particular. That is to say, if
the young people had succeeded in killing
ABB (as deputized agents of a just state),
they would not have wronged him, but their
action would have come at a significant
moral cost, even though it resulted from a
situation forced upon them. 
On Kant’s account, we experience the un-
dertaking of such violent actions in non-ide-
al conditions as fundamentally inconsistent
with what our commitment to justice ideally
requires of us. We experience ourselves,
Kant says, as «do[ing] wrong in the highest
degree» (MM, 6: 307f)23 when we use vio-
lence against one another, including, of
course when we subject another, aggressing
person to lethal violence.24 In this case, an-
yone committed to justice would want to
stop ABB before he managed to kill anyone
and to bring him, as we say, «to justice» –
which, as explained above, ideally means
bringing him to trial, where the court will
decide what should be done (whether he
should be punished or forced to receive
mental health treatment). Following that,
the police and other public officers (prison
guards or high-security mental health work-
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ers) enforce this decision on behalf of all of
us. This is the process we ideally want when
we seek to bring perpetrators to justice. In
the counterfactual case in which people had
managed to stop ABB by killing him, they
would experience having killed him as com-
ing at a moral cost because such lethal vio-
lence conflicts with our own commitment to
humanity or to regarding persons as having
inviolable worth. Killing ABB on Utøya, al-
though legally justified, would have in-
volved one person deciding to end another
person’s life, which is something we do not
view ourselves as having the moral authori-
ty to do with regard to one another.25
These are the reasons why, then, on
Kant’s account, it was so important to sub-
ject ABB to justice in the public court sys-
tem, where everyone involved – except the
accused – affirmed the rules and norms of
respect constitutive of the courtroom. That
behavior made it possible for us all to up-
hold our commitment to humanity and to
interacting rightfully at all times. In other
words, by so interacting with ABB, we up-
held the humanity in him that he himself
proved so utterly incapable of upholding.
We also treated him in accordance with the
laws that govern all our interactions
through the authority of public representa-
tives of the people, namely, court officials
whose actions themselves are delineated by
the law. The public officials lived up to the
authority entrusted to them by ensuring that
the law was followed at all times; they were
not there as private persons but as public
representatives of all of us who were author-
ized to evaluate the wrongdoer’s actions on
everyone’s, including ABB’s, behalf. The
witnesses, in turn, helped the public author-
ity perform their task by truthfully and re-
spectfully telling them the facts. As each sur-
viving witness and each bereaved family
member took the stand, their ability to up-
hold the ideals of humanity and enable the
courtroom to function – despite the way
ABB so brutally violated those ideals for
them personally – filled us with the deepest
respect and gratitude. Those of us who have
not had a similar experience have no cer-
tainty that we would be able to behave as
they did; we only know that they showed us
both how to do it and the importance of do-
ing it. The witnesses and the public officials
at trial enabled us all to uphold our own
commitment to our humanity and to the
public, legal institutions that ABB had so vi-
olently attacked.
The way the trial was conducted was im-
portant, then, because, we experienced a
public authority that functioned as a repre-
sentative of us all, composed of public per-
sons who reasoned and acted in ways deter-
mined by the public laws, whose aim was to
protect each citizen’s rights without subject-
ing them to private opinions of right and
wrong. The legal system enabled us to deter-
mine rightful use of force, either punishment
or forced mental health treatment, in re-
sponse to ABB’s violent transgressions of the
laws. Moreover, this case illustrates how im-
portant the role of the public authority is
when we face situations where crucial facts
are uncertain, which in this case, was
whether ABB was legally sane during the at-
tacks. We lacked the facts to settle this ques-
tion, and the Court-appointed experts disa-
greed. These non-ideal circumstances also
make the ideal solution – the public rule of
law – the most pragmatic solution. Given
the difficult or non-ideal circumstances con-
cerning our knowledge of ABB’s legal sanity,
all we could do was to ensure that the best
(psychiatric and legal) expert judgments
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were employed to investigate the issue, and
then entrust the court, as our final public
representatives, to determine the correct ap-
plication of the law in this particular case.
This Kantian account of why we need to
bring people to justice by subjecting them to
the public rule of law and the way this case
proceeded explains why even those who dis-
agreed with the court’s ruling on ABB’s legal
sanity considered the verdict legitimate.
4. The Difference between 
Retributive Punishment and 
Forvaring
In this section, I take the controversial stand
that the current Penal Code in Norway is un-
able to deal with particularly heinous crimes,
which undermines the legal system’s ability
to restore justice after certain serious crimes
have been committed – something revealed
also in this case. I argue that the legal system
must be able to guarantee its citizens that if
they are subjected to terrible crimes and they
remain committed to the legal system in their
responses to these crimes, then once the trial
is over, their exposure to the violator must be
over too. Currently, the Norwegian legal sys-
tem is unable to do this, and so it is unable to
guarantee victims the necessary space to
grieve and heal. Despite all its merits, the le-
gal proceedings could not bring the full,
right kind of closure to the case.
Many Norwegian citizens, including vic-
tims of these crimes, continue to find it mor-
ally offensive that the punishment for ABB’s
crimes is only 21 years (even though the
clause of «forvaring» makes it practically
unlikely that he will ever be free again). In
my view, Norwegians are rightfully offend-
ed about this. A maximum limit of 21 years
in prison for any imaginable crime makes
little sense. The current Norwegian Penal
Code likely grew out of theories popular in
the 60s and 70s, theories according to which
crime is the result of lamentable socio-eco-
nomic conditions and the aim is always to
restore the criminals fully to society. Of
course, poor socio-economic conditions
contribute to crime and typically our aim
should be to see punishment as leading to
restoring people as members of the commu-
nity. Assuming that ABB is legally sane, it is
quite possible that his lack of a healthy sense
of self (his NPD) is due at least partially to
his less than ideal childhood. Conceivably,
Norwegian child protective services should
have intervened early in ABB’s life in order
to protect his rights, in which case we all
failed him at that point.26 The relationship
between problematic childhoods – which
we all, through the public authority, have a
responsibility to do something about – and
personality disorders may provide us with
yet another reason to eschew the death pen-
alty27 and offer ABB therapy. After all, per-
haps only by such interventions do we take
into account the complex stories behind
crimes that involve the failures of the state
and society to protect vulnerable children.
Nevertheless, it remains the case that to
have an NPD is not to be incapable of legal
responsibility.28 Such crimes involve many
choices. Even this extreme situation, if we
go by ABB’s own report of his stream of
consciousness as he undertook the killings,
involved many decisions – and ABB was and
is responsible for these choices.
Kant is famous for defending a retributive
theory of punishment, according to which
the automatic, corresponding punishment
for choosing to kill another innocent person
should be death (or, in my considered Kan-
tian view, life in prison).29 To me, the inabil-
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ity of the current legal system to bring full
closure to this case should cause us to revisit
this currently unpopular line of reasoning
with regard to punishment. The retributive
argument is simple: If you kill another inno-
cent person, the life you took is not equiva-
lent to 21 years of your own life. You are
equals, and both of your lives are invalua-
ble. There is no price tag on another’s life; if
you murder an innocent person, then your
life as a free person should be over too.
Perhaps there are reasons to equate one
life sentence to 21 years, but we have to jus-
tify the equation, not simply assume it. It is
simply incorrect that 21 years of imprison-
ment is a life-sentence (one that lasts the rest
of one’s life, or what traditionally was called
«livstid» or «lifetime» sentence in Norwe-
gian). Regardless of whether a lifetime in
prison is best understood as equivalent to 21
years, I believe that the way in which the
current Norwegian Penal Code limits pun-
ishment for any crime to 21 years in prison
is unjustifiable. However heinous a crime
one commits and however many people it
affects, one cannot be sentenced in a single
trial to more than 21 years. Assuming good
behavior and no «forvaring» condition on
the sentence, one has the right to be consid-
ered for release after completing 2/3 of one’s
sentence, or 14-15 years. This is, in my view,
deeply problematic and morally offensive as
it cannot be reconciled with each person’s
equal right to freedom.
One way to illustrate the problem goes
like this: ABB killed 77 people, and each
killing becomes equivalent to 1/77th of 21
years, or 0.273 years or a little over three
months, according to the current Norwe-
gian Penal Code. If we include the number
of other people who were physically harmed
by ABB, the punishment for each killing be-
comes even less, and so even more absurd. If
we consider the fact that ABB also under-
took terror attacks against the state (so
against all of us, or public crimes), then the
punishment he received for each crime be-
comes even less, and even more absurd still.
Again, this sentence fails to treat each citi-
zen as having inviolable worth equal to that
of any and all other human beings. Instead,
the current Penal Code in Norway weighs
each of ABB’s victims’ value as 1/nth, where
«n» is the number of victims involved in the
trial. The resulting punishment cannot, in
principle, match the wrongdoing, which, I
believe, is one reason why so many are
rightly upset with the legal system’s inability
to bring proper closure to this case – to
bring ABB to justice for his crimes. Hence,
even if a life sentence may, for some reason,
be deemed 21 years, then for each life one
takes, one should get one life sentence. It
should not be legally neutral whether one
kills one, two, or many – each life should
count as one when we measure punish-
ment.30Of course, one might agree with this
principle, but maintain that ABB is punished
for each crime by paying for all of them con-
currently (at the same time) rather than con-
secutively (one life sentence after another). I
find this analysis unconvincing. Concurrent
sentences may be plausible in some cases, as
in lesser crimes or in non-bodily crimes,
such as thefts. When we are dealing with in-
tentional killing of other people and espe-
cially where each particular person is killed
intentionally and particularly heinously (as
in this case), there seems to be no good rea-
son to appeal to the logic of concurrent sen-
tencing.
Yet perhaps consecutive or concurrent
sentencing is simply inappropriate for some
crimes, like the one we are dealing with
NFT-2014-3-4.book  Page 255  Tuesday, November 25, 2014  1:03 PM
256 · helga varden
here. Some crimes are such that the idea of
the criminal once again becoming one of us
(our community) as an equal again is moral-
ly perverted or absurd. For some crimes –
like those committed by ABB – the idea of a
terminate sentence of any kind is in itself a
moral perversion or absurdity; we cannot
even envision what such an appropriate
punishment could possibly be. All we do
know is that the moral idea of becoming
equal members of society again is impossi-
ble; it simply makes no sense, and this is
why most Norwegians remain profoundly
upset about this aspect of the trial. Some
crimes are so heinous and vast in their im-
pact that once the trial is over, unchosen ex-
posure to the criminal in question must also
end, and end for good. These kinds of
crimes threaten to undo or unground people
by robbing them either of their loved ones
or of their trust in the world exactly because
they are healthy human beings. The victims
(first and foremost those who were directly
attacked and their loved ones, and then all
of us, as Norwegians) have a right to the si-
lence and peace required to heal and return
to life. The legal system doesn’t function
well if it cannot guarantee the kind of peace
victims of such heinous crimes need, to find
their way forward again. The current system
upholds principles according to which vic-
tims have a duty of justice to face or interact
with the perpetrator once again, as a free
person; perhaps on the street or in the gro-
cery store as a free citizen – possibly in 15
years time. But any determinate number of
years to be served in prison is wrong, since
there cannot be an «after the sentence is
served» in these cases. The state cannot pre-
sume that its citizens have such a duty of
justice to prepare for interaction as equals in
society again. Sometimes interaction must
be over for good, and this is one of those
times. Those who were subjected to ABB’s
violence should have been able to know that
after the trial they would never have to be
exposed to or interact with him ever again.
Whether or not they will interact should be
a question over which they have control
(such as choosing to visit him in prison, say,
as part of the healing process).31 We all
should remain committed to ABB being
treated respectfully in prison, but it should
not be the case that his victims are required
to start mentally preparing for having to
face him again, even relatively soon, as a
free man in society. That the legal system
cannot guarantee this, I believe, is a pro-
found failure.32
It may be objected at this point that real-
istically ABB will never again be a free citi-
zen, since the Penal Code has the category of
«forvaring» exactly to ensure justice by pre-
venting morally ill people like ABB from be-
ing released. I believe this argument is mis-
taken. The category of «forvaring» is the
correct one to use to secure society against
persons whose unwillingness to deal with
their aggressive personality disorders makes
it impossible to release them safely back into
society. In legal systems that are committed
to the principle that mentally ill people
should not be punished for illegal violent ac-
tions, it seems correct to have a legal catego-
ry that ensures that morally ill persons who
have committed violent crimes have access
to mental health services to control the ag-
gressive aspects of their personality disor-
ders. In fact, my impression is that the «for-
varing» clause is increasingly applied exact-
ly in cases where the crimes are impossible
to explain except on the basis of some basic
moral illness, such as in cases of domestic
abuse of spouses and children. The account
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above is correct, it can explain why these
people are legally responsible and yet should
have access to the mental health services
they need to deal with their problems. Still,
the legal clause of forvaring deals with the
moral illness, not with the question of retri-
bution for the crime committed and for
which they are legally responsible. Although
the category of forvaring should be used in
cases involving aggressive NPDs, it should
not be a replacement for punishment, the
means by which we restore rightful rela-
tions. The category of «safekeeping» ad-
dresses the moral illness involved, but can-
not remedy an insufficiently retributive sen-
tence that fails to express proper respect for
the victims and their rights. The «forvaring»
clause and the prison sentence are two cate-
gories that do independent work.33
Conclusion
One of the most terrifying aspects of Adolf
Eichmann was the banality of his thinking
regarding his wrongdoing, as Hannah
Arendt argues in her Eichmann in Jerusa-
lem.34 Any plausible account of him, she
maintained, had to account for the fact that
he was, by any reasonable standard, a most
mediocre man who seemed unable to think
properly and so to know the difference be-
tween right and wrong. In his mind, he was
simply following orders and obeying the law
as he built a career for himself. Even though
Eichmann was «perfectly incapable of tell-
ing right from wrong» (Arendt 26, cf. 287)
and found himself «under circumstances
that make it well-nigh impossible for him to
know or to feel that he was doing wrong»
(Arendt 1992: 276), it was right that he was
punished, Arendt maintained, because he
«carried out, and therefore actively support-
ed, a policy of mass murder.» (Arendt 1992:
279) Eichmann had to hang because, despite
his lack of wrongful intent, «no one, that is,
no member of the human race, can be ex-
pected to want to share the earth» with him
(ibid.). Although it’s obvious that someone
who has acted as horrifically as Eichmann
does not «have a right to live» in a profound
sense, something about Arendt’s account, as
many have argued before me, doesn’t add
up. If you don’t know what you’re doing,
you can’t distinguish right from wrong, and
you live in circumstances where the «cul-
ture» around you can’t help you, then why
is justice still done when you are subjected
to the death penalty? Something doesn’t
seem quite right in the argument, including
the interpretation of Eichmann’s character.
The account above can be seen as one at-
tempt at giving a more nuanced account of
these kinds of criminals, one that can ex-
plain why people like Eichmann and ABB,
whose crimes are not motivated by self-in-
terest and whose actual intent is, in their
minds, not wrong, still remain responsible
for their crimes. More specifically, I have
suggested that part of what is so terrifying
about ABB is also that, like Eichmann, he is
a most mediocre person. Any interpretation
of what we saw that ascribes to him impres-
sive powers of any kind is irreconcilable
with the facts. ABB’s simple reasoning from
mistaken beliefs is also banal through and
through. I only differ from Arendt in offer-
ing a somewhat more complex account of
this banality. To start, one difference is my
emphasis on the way that ABB’s and Eich-
mann’s banal reasonings are matched by
equally simple emotional lives. A second
main difference is my suggestion that a lack
of self (their moral illness) explains their
lack of proper engagement with their beliefs
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and the shockingly simple nature of their
emotional lives. ABB is driven by the sense
of being seen, of being alive that he gets
from having a leading active role in his pre-
sumed political project. The information
Arendt gives us about Eichmann suggests
something similar. The main difference
seems to be that Eichmann didn’t share
ABB’s elation at committing the direct,
physical destruction of other human beings,
or this aggressive element of ABB’s NPD.
Otherwise, Eichmann and ABB both ap-
pear to lack a healthy sense of self and hence
are utterly self-absorbed. This self-absorp-
tion explains why Eichmann, in Arendt’s ac-
count , finds it so very difficult to «think
from the standpoint of someone else»
(Arendt 1992: 49), feels so easily «elated»
when he tells the story about himself in
terms of «stock phrases,» wants to get
caught (so that he got to tell his story in
court), and keeps writing his biography
(during his years in Argentina and in prison
in Israel). Both Eichmann and ABB lack ad-
equate interpersonal emotions; feel elated
when they describe their projects by stock
phrases (the core one being variations of
«obeying the law» for Eichmann and a core
role in «protecting Norwegian culture from
destruction» by «gruesome, but necessary»
actions for ABB); wanted to get caught so
that they could tell their stories in court; and
they found it tremendously important to
write the history (biographies) about their
«great» lives. And, of course, both took
themselves to be key elements of great mor-
al-political projects of German and Norwe-
gian self-realization. Eichmann took himself
to be the «expert» on the Jewish question
and ABB took himself to be the leader of
both the European contrajihadist movement
and Norway.
Given these analogies, I have argued, in
contrast to Arendt, that both Eichmann and
ABB had the ability to correct the mistaken
beliefs upon which their actions rested, and
this is why they both have been legally re-
sponsible for their actions. Neither has a
history of no interpersonal emotions ever
present (revealing no capacity for such emo-
tions) and both had many facts within reach
that simply didn’t fit the stories they were
telling themselves. For example, when asked
at trial if he would kill his own father if told
to do so by his leaders, Eichmann replied
that he certainly would if the case had been
proven against his father. He was then asked
if the case against the Jews he sent to the
concentration camps had been proven, and
he had (of course) no answer. Similarly,
when asked what was possibly heroic about
shooting defenseless children, ABB also
didn’t have an answer, but only awkwardly
said that they didn’t really look that young.
Moreover, both courts proved that Eichman
and ABB were able to correct mistaken be-
liefs. One might argue that self-correction
was harder in Eichmann’s case, since so
many around him supported what he did,
whereas ABB had much resistance in the
culture surrounding him. However, not only
did Eichmann’s own physical reactions re-
sist what he was doing (the violence in the
concentration camps made him physically
ill), but he was surrounded continuously by
desperate people. He chose to act on what
made him feel important and set aside eve-
rything in his reality that resisted that
choice. For that decision he is responsible
just as ABB was responsible for identifying
the «true» culture as being the extremist cul-
ture he could find via the web.
The trials gave both men opportunities to
start relating to what they have done in a
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truthful way, one that tracks reality as it ac-
tually is, not as it might be described to
make one feel smarter than everyone else
and a part of a big project and not in a way
that block challenges to what one is doing.
Eichmann failed to seize this opportunity
and so went to the gallows repeating his
stock phrases, and ABB also failed to start
this process in court. Their failures, howev-
er, do not lessen our duty to hold them and
ourselves to this standard of truthfulness
and respect for each person, the standard of
humanity. If the analysis in this paper is cor-
rect, then if ABB ever starts this process, the
standard of humanity involves the principle
of forvaring and we must give him access to
the mental health care he will need to do the
seemingly impossible: find a way to live
with what he has done.
Noter
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2 See http://www.nrk.no/contentfile/file/
1.8025126!tiltalen227.pdf for a redacted version 
of the charges against ABB.
3 ABB might have thought this because after World 
War II, there was a death penalty for treason and 
it was applied to some of the leading «Nasjonal 
Samling» (NS) leaders after the war. (NS was the 
fascist, nationalist political party led by Vidkun 
Quisling in Norway before and during the war.)
4 I have included these more descriptive parts in the 
paper so as to enable non-Norwegians to follow 
the analysis and engage the arguments.
5 The Commission originally asked for a clarifica-
tion from the psychiatrists, but even after it was 
provided, the Commission’s view was unclear. 
During the trial, when the Court questioned 
members of the Commission, it became apparent 
that in asking for the additional clarification from 
the second team of psychiatrists, the Commission 
had not «approved» the second report and that 
the Commission regarded the second report as 
weaker than the first.
6 First, there was disagreement over the existence of 
and his meetings with the leaders of the Knights 
Templar organization; when confronted with what 
appeared to be overwhelming evidence that the or-
ganization has never existed, ABB simply disa-
greed. Second, the prosecution argued that ABB 
lied when he claimed to have begun preparing for 
his attacks in 2002, since there is no evidence for 
(and much evidence against) this. On the basis of 
the first psychiatric report, reports from family 
and friends, and police interviews with ABB, the 
prosecution concluded that the writing of the man-
ifesto began around 2007 and that the planning of 
the actual attacks started in 2009. Third, the pros-
ecution maintained that ABB himself lied when he 
accused first team of psychiatrists of telling «200 
lies» in their report of his statements during Au-
gust 2011, because they had no reason (and very 
many reasons not) to lie. Fourth, the prosecution 
maintained that the evidence does not support 
ABB’s claim that if he had succeeded in killing 
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more people at Høyblokka he would not have pro-
ceeded to Utøya. The defense agreed with the pros-
ecution on the second and third points, and with 
ABB on the first and fourth.
7 The prosecutors emphasized that though in doubt 
they were more convinced by the first psychiatric 
report because it had evaluated ABB closer to the 
actual event, the Commission regarded it as the 
stronger report, and overall, it fit better with how 
friends and family had described ABB’s with-
drawal starting in 2006.
8 The Penal Code’s §147 has never before applied 
in a Norwegian trial. Penal Code §147a outlaws 
acts of terror intended to undermine a central 
function in society, by, for example, incapacitat-
ing government activity or public works, or creat-
ing serious fear among the population. The pros-
ecution argued that ABB’s acts of terror also em-
ployed methods outlawed in Penal Code §148 
(which forbids setting explosions that could lead 
to the loss of human life or the extensive destruc-
tion of others’ property) and Penal Code §223 
(which concerns intentional killing under «sharp-
ened conditions,» conditions that make the kill-
ing especially heinous).
9 For the prosecution’s procedure, see: http://
nrk.no/227/dag-for-dag/rettssaken---aktoratets-
prosedyre-1.8213456
10For the defender’s procedure, see: http://nrk.no/
227/dag-for-dag/forsvarets-sluttprosedyre-
1.8216158
11These were the captain of the ferry, a 10-year old 
boy, and a young man whom he identified (pre-
sumably due to his «preppy» appearance) as «be-
longing to them,» meaning ABB’s ultranationalist 
«kind.»
12 I am grateful to David Sussman for having sug-
gested this phrase to me and for patiently discuss-
ing many of the issues in this section with me.
13 One question that keeps puzzling me (a non-expert 
on psychology/psychiatry) is whether someone 
suffering from a psychosis actually can have such 
clear memories of the crimes as ABB does and also 
not struggle (emotionally or cognitively) when 
facts disputing their sense of reality are presented.
14My account is inspired by recent work in Kantian 
moral psychology, especially that of Ingrid Albre-
cht, Lucy Allais, Barbara Herman, and David 
Sussman.
15 We all, of course, have some of these tendencies, 
and some of us have more than others because of 
having been subjected to abusive behavior. Hence, 
at times, we all need to pay extra attention to our-
selves to heal wounds or care a little especially for 
bits that have been badly trampled on. These nor-
mal features of a fragile human life differ from the 
experience of someone who is struggling with an 
NPD. Such a person does not only experience her-
self as sometimes more vulnerable or defensive, but 
as generally struggling to experience appropriate 
moral emotions. The all-encompassing nature of 
the struggle is why its existential challenges are so 
significant and difficult to face. 
16 In my view, these ideas reflect the relationship 
Kant envisions between morality and human na-
ture, as in the Religion within the Boundaries of 
mere Reason (6: 26-9). According to Kant, the 
predisposition to good in human nature has three 
elements to it: The first (to «animality») concerns 
our basic, unreflective social nature; the second 
(to «humanity») concerns our susceptibility to 
how others conceive of us (which requires simple 
comparative uses of reason); and the third (to 
«personality») concerns our susceptibility to mo-
rality and its demands (which requires reflective, 
practical uses of reason). In the analysis in the pa-
per, the first idea informs the way in which I de-
scribe a healthy self as being personally and so-
cially identified (“animality»), the second in-
forms the idea of how a health self assumes being 
seen by others (“humanity»), and the third in-
forms the idea of how reflection enables us to 
both correct beliefs and behavior (“personality»). 
Going into these exegetical aspects of Kant is ob-
viously impossible, but notice that my analysis 
can be supported by any theory that has such a 
three-fold combination of unreflective and reflec-
tive elements of our basic emotional life.
17We never saw how he would interact with his 
friends since they needed him to leave the room 
when they testified; his mother naturally never 
testified.
18When he was a little boy (4 years old) the Norwe-
gian child services were alerted and undertook 
psychiatric evaluations of him; the relevant court 
sessions were conducted behind closed doors for 
confidentiality reasons.
19Hence, this account is compatible with maintain-
ing that some types of psychopaths completely 
lack the capacity for other-directed emotions of 
any kind (see, for example, Jeffrie G. Murphy’s 
article «Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psy-
chopathy,» Ethics, Vol 82:4, 1972: 284-98 for 
such an analysis of psychopathy; see especially 
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pp. 294ff.); my claim here is simply that ABB is 
not one of these. 
20 I’m especially grateful to Duff, Herman, and Yan-
kah for making me clarify this point. 
21 It may be impossible for anyone today to actually 
settle the issue of ABB’s legal sanity at the time of 
the actions since obtaining this knowledge would 
require access to ABB’s mind both at the time of 
the crimes and during the interviews, which is im-
possible. In addition, the original interviews were 
not recorded electronically.
22For such a deputy interpretation, see Sussman’s 
«On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness: Kant on 
Lying in Self-Defense,» in The Philosophy of De-
ception, ed. Clancy Martin (Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2009, 225-43). 
23Kant, Immanuel The Metaphysics of Morals, 
transl. and ed. by M. Gregor (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press: Cambridge, 1996).
24On this reading of Kant, to kill someone is to do 
a generally wrong action – it involves, in «Kan-
tianese,» acting on a rule (maxim) that cannot 
hold as a universal law. Hence, choosing that ac-
tion (killing) makes the option of interacting un-
der universal laws impossible. This is why the ac-
tion of killing the killer is experienced as coming 
at a moral cost even though it does not wrong the 
killer. I defend this approach in «Kant and Lying 
to the Murderer at the Door… One more Time: 
Kant’s Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers 
and Nazis,» The Journal of Social Philosophy, 
Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 2010: 403-421. A main al-
ternative reading of Kant on this point could ar-
gue that since one is forced into the situation 
where killing the other is the only option, killing 
the other is not to do wrong in the highest degree 
and does not come at a moral cost.
25 In fact, this may be a reason to think that Kant is 
wrong in thinking we can have the death penalty. 
Perhaps the death penalty, though morally appro-
priate in the sense of fitting the crimes, requires 
people to do something that no morally healthy 
human being can do or can feel authorized to do 
(namely, execute another, now defenseless per-
son). Hence the death penalty may be both mor-
ally necessary and morally impossible. I am grate-
ful to David Sussman for helping me clarify my 
thoughts on this issue.
26 The extent to which this is indeed the case depends 
upon psychiatric evaluations of ABB conducted at 
the time, but the public does not – as it should not – 
have access to such confidential documents.
27 At this point in time, it seems over-determined that 
imposing the death penalty in a well-functioning 
legal system is simply unjustifiable, but going into 
this issue here would take me too far afield.
28 If my analysis is correct, then it is not the case that 
serious violent crimes of this kind will go away 
even in very affluent societies (like Norway). 
And, indeed, current research does not indicate 
that Norway – now the richest welfare state in the 
world – has fewer people struggling with person-
ality disorders than other countries. Its high levels 
of domestic abuse equal those of other countries. 
29See note 25 for explication of why I believe that 
the death penalty should be taken off the Kantian 
table.
30 The prosecutors’ closing argument is that the actu-
al punishment will be the same regardless of 
whether or not ABB is charged only with Penal 
Code paragraph 147a (public crime, or a crime 
against the state) or also with Penal Codes 148 (a 
public crime) and 223 (77 counts of private crimes, 
or crimes against private citizens). It seems to me, 
however, that he should be charged with all of 
these charges as well as with x number of counts of 
each one (one or two counts of 147, one or two 
counts of 148, and finally 77 counts of murder un-
der «sharpened conditions»). Each of these counts 
should carry a life sentence and he should be 
charged for each count of physical injury.
31As pointed out to me by Broadie and Yankah, a 
full account of this probably engages the histori-
cal category of being banished from societies, but 
for reasons of space I set aside this question here.
32 I’m most grateful to Duff, Herman, and Sussman 
for helping me clarify my thoughts on punish-
ment here.
33 One may object that Norway has never had to deal 
with mass murderers post-WWII and we should 
not change the system in response to only one case. 
My claim, however, is that we should change the 
law not because of this one case, but because the 
law is incorrect. This case has only made obvious 
problems that have existed for a long time.
34See both Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusa-
lem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin 
books, 1992) and Margarethe von Trolla’s 2012 
film Hannah Arendt about the writing and publi-
cation of this book. My revised analysis of Eich-
mann is also consistent with relevant sections of 
Bettina Stangneth’s Eichmann before Jerusalem: 
The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer 
(Knopf: New York, 2014).
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